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The Impact of Peer Performance Information on Subsequent 
Cooperation 
 
 
Xinyu Zhang, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Co-supervisors: Steven J. Kachelmeier and Michael G. Williamson 
 
 I design an experiment to examine whether peer performance information (PPI) in 
an individual productive task can enhance subsequent cooperation by revealing coworker 
similarities. In groups of four, participants first individually complete either a relatively 
easy or difficult math task, and then engage in a public-goods game in which individual 
contributions are collectively beneficial but individually suboptimal. Results indicate that 
when group members exhibit similar individual task performance and when the 
individual task is difficult, PPI significantly increases individual contributions in the 
public-goods game. Conceptually, PPI in such settings reveals the challenge common to 
all group members, thereby establishing a social bond that enhances subsequent 
cooperation. Conversely, when PPI reveals dissimilar performance among group 
members, PPI does not appear to reduce cooperation. Overall, in contrast to the prior 
focus on the relative differences revealed by performance information about peers, my 
study suggests that PPI can increase rather than decrease subsequent cooperation by 
revealing individual similarities. The findings provide important practical implications on 
conditions under which organizations can benefit from the positive spillover effect of PPI 
on subsequent employee cooperation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In many organizations, employees work on both individual and cooperative tasks 
(Cohen and Bailey 1997). In an individual task, employees exert independent effort, 
while in a cooperative task, they have opportunities to combine resources to achieve 
something collectively as a group. In recent decades, the percentage of cooperative tasks 
at work has grown significantly (Cross, Rebele, and Grant 2016). Ranging from informal 
knowledge sharing to self-organized teams, employee cooperation often adds 
considerable value to companies (Thompson and Choi 2006). Thus, for these 
organizations, it is important not only to incentivize individual productivity but also to 
motivate collective cooperation.  
In such environments, employees often also have access to information that 
reveals their peers’ performance in individual tasks. For instance, retailers and banks 
often display employee performance information on leaderboards and internal 
information systems (O’Connell 2008; Gino and Staats 2011; Silverman 2011). In 
academia, schools and departments regularly update public information regarding faculty 
publications and research projects (Kachelmeier 2018). Even when organizations do not 
explicitly distribute employee performance information, several contemporary practices 
at work, such as regular workshops and open workspaces, allow employees to learn about 
their peers’ work performance via direct observation (Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and 
Moretti 2009). I define such information as peer performance information (PPI) and 
examine whether and how providing employees with PPI in an individual productive task 
impacts their subsequent cooperation in a cooperative task.  
 2 
 
This research question is important because prior research on relative 
performance information (RPI) and social comparison suggests that organizations could 
face a tradeoff between the effect of PPI on employees’ motivation in individual tasks 
and their willingness to cooperate.1 Specifically, by inducing social comparison, PPI can 
motivate greater effort on individual tasks because people are concerned with how they 
perform relative to their peers (Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman 2008; Tafkov 2013; 
Wang 2017). However, psychology research suggests that social comparisons can also 
lead to envy and frustration (Smith 2000; Mussweiler, Rüter, and Espstude 2004), which 
could harm employees’ willingness to cooperate with each other. Thus, to the extent that 
PPI reveals performance differences among individuals, it could increase individual 
productivity at the cost of subsequent employee cooperation. 
In contrast to this perspective, the current study considers the possibility that PPI 
can reveal performance similarities among individuals as well as performance differences. 
In the form of absolute performance, PPI not only provides employees with relative 
performance feedback but also presents the overall performance distribution in the peer 
group. Thus, PPI can reveal either performance similarities or performance differences 
among group members, depending on the performance variance within the peer group. 
Under this premise, I examine a potential benefit of PPI on employee cooperation. 
Namely, I develop and test theory suggesting that PPI in an individual task can increase 
                                                          
1 Relative performance information (RPI) refers to information that provides relative performance feedback 
to employees. PPI can be viewed as a specific type of RPI because by revealing the performance levels of 
peers, PPI also inform employees of their relative performance standing in the peer group.  
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rather than decrease employee subsequent cooperation in a cooperative task by revealing 
coworker similarities.  
Research finds that individuals tend to bond over shared similarities (Miller, 
Downs, and Prentice 1998; Towry 2003; Haesebrouck, Cools, and Van den Abbeele 
2017). Thus, to the extent that PPI reveals similar task performance among individuals, it 
should increase their subsequent cooperation. However, drawing from research in 
behavioral economics and psychology, I predict that the positive effect of PPI on 
subsequent cooperation among employees with similar individual task performance 
further depends on the difficulty of the individual task. In particular, prior studies find 
that people have different biases when evaluating their relative performance for difficult 
tasks versus easy tasks. Specifically, individuals tend to underestimate their relative 
performance for difficult tasks and overestimate their relative performance for easy tasks 
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999; Kruger 1999; Klar 2002; Hales and Kachelmeier 2009). As a 
result, when a task is relatively difficult, individuals expect to underperform others, and 
hence are likely to bond with coworkers over PPI that indicates that they and their peers 
face common challenges with similar task performance. However, when a task is 
relatively easy, individuals expect to outperform their peers, and hence are less likely to 
bond over PPI that reveals that their performance is, in fact, no better than their peers. In 
summary, I predict that when individuals have similar individual task performance, PPI 
increases subsequent cooperation to a greater extent when the individual task is difficult 
than when it is easy. 
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The social comparison literature documents that people with very different 
performance tend to report that they like and trust each other less (Salovey and Rodin 
1984; Stapel and Kooman 2005; Dunn, Ruedy, and Schweitzer 2012). Thus, to the extent 
that PPI reveals dissimilar task performance among individuals, it should lead to social 
distancing rather than social bonding and decrease individuals’ subsequent cooperation. 
Because it is unclear how task difficulty might interact with this negative effect, I predict 
that when individuals have dissimilar individual task performance, PPI reduces 
subsequent cooperation irrespective of the difficulty level of the individual task. 
I conduct a two-stage laboratory experiment to test my predictions. In Stage 1, 
participants are randomly assigned to groups of four and work individually on a math 
task for four periods. In each period, participants have a maximum of three minutes to 
solve as many two-digit multiplication problems as possible, with the option to end the 
period early and relax. To avoid potential confounds from wealth effects and pay 
comparisons, all participants receive fixed pay for performing the math task irrespective 
of the number of problems solved.  
I employ a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subject design with two manipulated factors and 
one measured factor. I manipulate the presence of PPI for the Stage 1 math task by 
providing participants with only their own performance or by providing the performance 
of all participants within their group. I manipulate the difficulty level of the Stage 1 math 
task by either allowing or disallowing participants to use pen and paper to solve the 
two-digit multiplication problems. In addition to the two manipulated factors, I measure 
performance variance for each group and classify participants as being in a group with 
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similar task performance if the group’s Stage 1 task performance variance is below the 
median of the assigned condition, and as being in a group with dissimilar task 
performance if its performance variance is at or above the median. 
After completing Stage 1, participants proceed to Stage 2 to complete a 
public-goods game within the same group of four. In this game, participants start with 
100 points and decide how many points to invest in a group project. The total number of 
points invested by all four participants in a group is then doubled and redistributed 
equally to the four participants. In this setting, contributing to the group project is 
collectively beneficial but individually suboptimal, such that the dominant strategy is not 
to contribute, even though cooperation can yield a Pareto superior outcome for all group 
members. I use the number of points a participant contributes to the group project as a 
proxy for his/her willingness to cooperate with other group members. 
Results indicate that the effect of PPI in Stage 1 on participants’ cooperation in 
Stage 2 depends on both performance similarity and task difficulty level in Stage 1. In 
particular, when group members exhibit similar performance in the Stage 1 math task, 
PPI significantly increases individual contributions in the public-goods game in the High 
Difficulty condition (no pen or paper allowed to solve the multiplication problems) but 
not in the Low Difficulty condition (pen and paper allowed). Consistent with my 
hypothesis, this finding suggests that, when revealing group members’ similar task 
performance in a difficult individual task, PPI establishes a social bond that enhances 
subsequent cooperation by revealing a common challenge shared by all group members. 
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When group members have dissimilar performance in the Stage 1 math task, 
however, I do not find a harmful effect of PPI on subsequent cooperation with the 
exception of top performers in the high-difficulty condition. In particular, I find some 
evidence that when task difficulty is high, providing PPI marginally decreases individual 
contributions for participants ranking first and second in groups with dissimilar peer 
performance, while having little effect on other participants. In summary, these findings 
underscore the importance of considering the level of employee performance similarities 
when evaluating the effect of PPI. 
In supplemental analyses, my results confirm the motivational benefit of PPI in 
individual tasks found in prior studies (e.g., Tafkov 2013; Wang 2017). Specifically, in 
the Stage 1 math task, I find that providing PPI significantly increases the amount of time 
participants voluntarily spend on the multiplication problems, even though their fixed 
compensation in the Stage 1 task does not depend on either absolute or relative task 
performance. This result suggests that organizations potentially benefit in both individual 
productivity and employee cooperation via the provision of PPI. 
This study has several implications for research and practice. First, it contributes 
to a growing literature examining the effects of performance information about peers 
(e.g., Hannan, McPhee, Newman, and Tafkov 2013; Tafkov 2013; Newman and Tafkov 
2014; Kramer, Maas, and Rinsum 2016; Wang 2017; Chan 2018; Hannan, McPhee, 
Newman, and Tafkov 2018). While prior research finds that performance information 
about peers can influence individual behavior by emphasizing performance differences 
among individuals (e.g., providing performance ranking information or recognizing the 
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best performer), my study suggests that performance information about peers can also 
influence individual behavior by revealing performance similarities. In particular, I find 
that informing individuals that they share similar performance in a challenging individual 
task leads coworkers to be more likely to cooperate with each other in a subsequent 
cooperative task. 
Second, my study documents a conceptually distinct advantage of PPI in addition 
to the motivational benefit found in prior research (e.g., Tafkov 2013; Hannan et al. 2013; 
Wang 2017). By identifying performance similarity and task difficulty as two important 
moderators of the effect of PPI, my study provides implications on the specific settings in 
which organizations can benefit from the positive spillover effect of PPI on cooperation. 
As PPI is effective in bonding employees when revealing common challenges shared by 
peers, organizations can consider facilitating employees with the access to PPI among 
new recruits, when a challenging task is introduced, or during difficult times.  
Furthermore, this study answers the call for more attention to workforce 
composition in managerial accounting research (Luft 2016). My results show that 
receiving PPI in a difficult task can promote cooperation among employees with similar 
performance, but has limited impact on subsequent cooperation among employees with 
dissimilar performance. Building on research by Arnold, Hannan, and Tafkov (2018) and 
Chan, Kachelmeier, and Zhang (2018), my study suggests that the level of performance 
similarities among workers is an important factor that moderates the effectiveness of 
management control practices.  
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Lastly, this study also contributes to the literature that examines the effect of 
management control practices on employee cooperation (e.g., Chen, Williamson, and 
Zhou 2012; Haesebrouck, Van den Abbeele, and Williamson 2015; Kachelmeier, 
Williamson, and Zhang 2017; Thomas and Thornock 2017; Arnold, Hannan, and Tafkov 
2017). While prior research focuses on the effect of incentives and feedback directly 
related to the cooperative task, my study suggests that providing employees with 
performance feedback (i.e., PPI) on a separate individual task can also have important 
spillover effects on subsequent employee cooperation.  
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I review 
and discuss prior studies that examine the behavioral effect of RPI. Chapter 3 develops 
the main hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the laboratory experimental design and 
procedures. Chapter 5 presents the tests of the main hypotheses and a series of 
supplemental analyses. In Chapter 6, I provide the concluding remarks and discuss future 
research opportunities. 
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Chapter 2: Review and Discussion of the RPI Literature 
Background 
Many organizations provide employees with information about their peers’ 
performance. For example, in academia, schools and departments regularly update 
information regarding the latest publications and research projects of the faculty members 
on websites and newsletters (Kachelmeier 2018). In some universities, faculty members 
also have access to their colleagues’ teaching evaluation scores (Rosen 2017). Similarly, 
in the corporate world, call centers, retailers, and banks also often display employee 
performance information on leaderboards or internal feedback systems (O’Connell 2008; 
Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011; Gino and Staats 2011). 
Even when organizations do not explicitly disseminate employee performance 
information, employees have many opportunities to obtain peers’ performance 
information by observing those who work in proximity (Towry 2003; Mas and Moretti 
2009; Corsello and Minor 2017). This is consistent with evidence that peer performance 
appraisals have well-established predictive validity and reliability (Kane and Lawler 1978; 
Schmitt, Gooding, Noe, and Kirsch 1984). Several contemporary practices at work likely 
further facilitate employees’ direct access to peer performance. For example, technology 
firms and research institutions often hold regular meetings and workshops at which 
employees present their work (Florida and Goodnight 2005). A growing number of 
organizations have adopted common and open workspaces in which employees can more 
easily observe the work progress of others (Mas and Moretti 2009; Waber, Magnolfi, and 
Lindsay 2014; Nielsen 2016). 
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One important feedback employees can obtain from peers’ performance 
information is their relative performance standing in the peer group. One stream of 
studies in managerial accounting refers to such feedback as relative performance 
information (i.e., RPI), and examines its effect on individual behavior. Below I review 
the RPI literature and discuss its implications to for the current study.  
Review of the RPI Literature 
The RPI literature draws on social comparison theory to examine whether and 
how RPI influences individual behavior by revealing performance differences among 
individuals. Social comparison theory states that individuals have an innate desire to 
compare themselves with others to evaluate or improve some aspects about the self 
(Festinger 1954; Gibbons and Buunk 1999; Suls and Wheeler 2000). As such, the 
outcome of social comparison has a significant influence on one’s self-image if it reveals 
that individuals are different from others in the aspect of interest (Suls, Martin, and 
Wheeler 2002). Specifically, when outperforming others, individuals receive positive 
feedback on the self, and their self-image enhances (Gibbons and Gerrad 1997;               
Tesser et al. 2000). In contrast, self-image suffers when underperforming others 
(Mussweiler and Strack 2000; Moore 2007). Thus, in the presence of RPI, the incentive 
to keep a positive self-image motivates individuals to engage in costly actions to achieve 
better relative standing even though outperforming others does not confer monetary or 
other tangible benefits.2  
                                                          
2 Another literature examines the motivational effect of incorporating RPI in compensation contracts 
(e.g., tournament). In contrast to the RPI literature, this literature relies on economic theory that RPI filters 
out common uncertainty shared by agents and induces employee effort in a less costly manner (Lazear and 
Rosen 1981; Holmstrom 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglize 1983; Frederickson 1992). 
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Consistent with this argument, a number of experimental studies document robust 
evidence that the mere presence of RPI can lead to greater effort and better performance 
from individuals under both flat wage (Tafkov 2013; Hannan et al. 2013; Kramer, Maas, 
and van Rinsum 2016; Wang 2017) and piece-rate incentive schemes (Hannan et al. 2008; 
Tafkov 2013).3 However, the motivational drive to get ahead of peers can also come at a 
cost. When the productive effort is not the only way to outperform others, research finds 
that RPI can lead to various counterproductive activities, including distorted effort 
allocation across different tasks (Hannan et al. 2013), dishonest performance reporting 
(Brown, Fisher, Sooy, and Sprinkle 2014), and sabotage activities that undermine peers’ 
performance (Wang 2017).  
 Prior research also finds that the effect of RPI on both productive and 
counterproductive behavior can be magnified when certain attributes of RPI emphasize or 
enlarge the performance difference among individuals. For example, compared to private 
RPI, public RPI has a stronger effect on both productive effort and distorted effort 
allocation (Tafkov 2013; Hannan et al. 2013). Similarly, in a multi-task setting, RPI that 
is based on cumulative performance over multiple periods leads to more distorted effort 
allocation than RPI that is reset each period (Hannan et al. 2018). The moderating effect 
of these RPI features further supports that the behavioral effect of RPI is driven by 
revealing performance differences among individuals and inducing social comparison.  
                                                          
3 Hannan et al. (2008) and Newman and Tafkov (2015) examine the motivational effectiveness of RPI 
under a tournament incentive scheme. The results suggest that RPI hurts performance if the tournament 
only rewards the top performer but improves performance if the tournament both rewards the top 
performers and punishes the bottom performers. 
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Discussion of the RPI Literature 
As noted above, a commonality shared by prior RPI studies is the focus on how 
performance information about peers influences behavior by highlighting relative 
differences among individuals. This focus is reflected by the literature’s strong reliance 
on social comparison theory. In particular, most of the behavioral effects documented in 
the literature result from the comparison people make when learning how they perform 
relative to others and are moderated by factors that influence the strength of such 
comparison. Furthermore, to facilitate the testing of social comparison theory, prior 
studies predominantly operationalize RPI as performance information in relative forms 
such as ranking information (e.g.,Tafkov 2013; Hannan et al. 2013; Hannan et al. 2018) 
or information about whether a participant’s performance is the best in a peer group 
(e.g., Wang 2017). 4 As such, any performance difference among individuals, despite its 
actual level, is made salient to participants. Although the perspective that RPI highlights 
individual differences has provided insightful implications in the literature, it may limit a 
complete understanding of the role of performance information about peers in practice. In 
contrast to this perspective, the current study considers the possibility that performance 
information about peers can reveal performance similarities among individuals as well as 
performance differences.   
                                                          
4 There are two exceptions. Kramer, Maas, and Rinsum (2016) examine the motivational effect of RPI in 
the form of rank versus absolute performance and do not find a significant difference. Hannan et al. (2018) 
examine the effect of RPI in the form of rank versus absolute performance (referred to as “actual-score 
RPI”) on effort distortion in multi-task setting. They do not find that effort distortion significantly differs 
between the two conditions when RPI is reset every period; however, effort distortion is significantly 
higher in the actual-score RPI condition than in the rank-score RPI condition when RPI is cumulative over 
all periods. Both studies argue that relative to rankings, actual-score RPI provides more detailed 
information about the performance differences between individuals, and do not examine whether the effect 
of actual-score RPI depends on performance similarity between individuals. 
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In practice, performance information about peers is often in the form of absolute 
performance information, i.e., PPI. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that explicit 
performance rankings are becoming less available as companies who were known for 
providing relative performance feedback (e.g., Accenture, Adobe, GE, and Microsoft) 
have restructured their performance review practices to reduce unhealthy competition 
among employees (Cappelli and Tavis 2016; Rock and Jones 2015). Moreover, when 
organizations make employees’ performance information accessible, the intent is also 
often to acknowledge joint progress rather than to emphasize performance differences 
between employees (Kachemeier 2018).  
The absolute performance feedback from PPI contains broader information than 
feedback on relative differences among individuals. While employees can still learn their 
relative performance, PPI also reveals the overall performance distribution in the peer 
group. Thus, PPI can reveal performance similarities among group members, depending 
on the performance variance within the peer group. Take the two groups in Figure 1 as an 
example. The relative position of each member in the group is the same across the two 
groups, but members of Group A have more similar performance than members of Group 
B. If only receiving ranking information, members in both groups would receive the same 
relative performance feedback that highlights the differences in their performance. In 
contrast, if each group member instead receives PPI, i.e., the absolute performance level 
of their peers, although the relative feedback is still available, PPI also reveals that 
members in Group A exhibit similar task performance, whereas members in Group B 
have very dissimilar task performance. 
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It is important to acknowledge that PPI can reveal individual performance 
similarities as well as differences for at least two reasons. First, organizations often make 
a significant investment in time and resources to select and recruit employees. Thus, even 
though employees can have various expertise and backgrounds, it is likely that employees 
considered as peers in one organization have relatively comparable ability and 
performance (Chow 1983; Kachelmeier and Williamson 2010; Cardinales, Chen, and Yin 
2018). Thus, from the perspective of providing practical implications, it is important to 
understand the effect of PPI in the setting where employees share similar performance.  
Second, I next develop and test theory suggesting that the effect of PPI on 
employee cooperation likely depends on whether PPI reveals similarities or 
dissimilarities among peers. Prior RPI and social comparison literature suggest that the 
social comparison process induced by PPI can lead to envy and frustration (e.g., Smith 
2000), which could harm employees’ willingness to cooperate with each other (Tafkov 
2013). In contrast to this perspective, I examine whether PPI can instead enhance 
subsequent cooperation in a cooperative task by revealing performance similarities shared 
by co-workers. I develop this prediction in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
Employee Cooperation 
Employee cooperation refers to the process in which a group of employees 
voluntarily exert and coordinate cooperative effort to achieve a common goal (Brief and 
Motowidlo 1986). As business becomes more cross-functional and workplaces become 
more open, there is an increasing number of opportunities for employees to cooperate 
with each other even when they do not belong to a formal team structure. For example, 
employees can share knowledge and information, form self-organized teams, and offer 
support and help with work-related tasks. By efficiently incorporating various expertise 
and resources, employee cooperation often creates significant value to organizations 
(Padsakoff, Whiting, and Podsakoff 2009). For example, prior research finds that 
cooperative effort among employees is more effective than individual effort in solving 
difficult problems (Klein and Epley 2015), generating innovative outcomes (Milliken, 
Bartel, Kurtzberg 2003), and improving firm performance (Grant and Partil 2012).  
Despite the benefits to organizations, the defining characteristic of a decision to 
cooperate with others is that it is individually costly (Cross et al. 2016; Arnold et al. 
2018). While the involvement in cooperative activities often consumes a significant 
amount of personal time and resources, individual contribution is difficult to measure and 
reward (Sprinkle and Williamson 2006). Prior research finds that employees who are 
known as givers at work often suffer in their own job prospects (Grant 2013). Given this 
“public-goods” nature of cooperation, organizations are eager to motivate employee 
cooperation. For example, Google launched an internal research project, Project Aristotle, 
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that was dedicated improving employee cooperation (Duhigg 2016). Similarly, Apple 
recently built a new campus that was designed to enhance employee cooperation (Hess 
2017).  
 Prior research finds that team-based incentives and other formal control 
mechanisms can increase cooperation by rewarding cooperative behavior and punishing 
uncooperative behavior (e.g., Coletti, Sedatole, and Towry 2005; Chen et al. 2012). 
However, it is still important to understand various factors that can influence employees’ 
willingness to cooperate with their peers in the absence of management control 
mechanisms directly related to the cooperative task. First, given employee cooperation is 
often spontaneous and outside the formal team structure, it is difficult to enforce 
management control for all cooperative opportunities. Second, even in the presence of a 
formal control mechanism, its effectiveness often also depends on the extent to which an 
employee cares about the success of the group as a whole (Towry 2003; Maas and Yin 
2018).  
 In this study, I argue that PPI on an individual productive task has an important 
spillover effect on employee cooperation in a subsequent unrelated task.5  In particular, I 
develop hypotheses suggesting that PPI can influence individuals’ willingness to 
cooperate with peers, with the influence likely to depend on whether PPI reveals similar 
or dissimilar performance. 
                                                          
5 I focus on the effect of PPI of an individual productive task on employee subsequent cooperation as 
opposed to the effect PPI in collaborative tasks (see Arnold et al. 2017; Thomas and Thornock 2017). 
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H1 - Peers with Similar Performance 
People often favor those who are similar to them over those who are dissimilar 
(Campbell 1958; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Research presents abundant 
evidence of the bonding effect of similarity, ranging from important commonality in 
personal traits, values, and interests (Byrne, Clore, and Smeaton 1986) to trivial 
resemblance in T-shirt color, birthdate, and accidental food choice (Miller, Downs, and 
Prentice 1998; Towry 2003; Wolley and Fishbach 2018). As a result, individuals sharing 
similarities tend to care more about the interests of each other (Cialdini and Trost 1998) 
and are more likely to help each other (Haesebrouck et al. 2017). Hence, to the extent that 
PPI reveals similar performance among peers, PPI should increase individuals’ 
willingness to cooperate with peers and contribute to the group’s success. 
However, other research challenges the notion that “birds of a feather flock 
together” and suggests that individuals do not always prefer being similar (Ariely and 
Levav 2000; Amodio and Showers 2005). Theory suggests that when people expect to be 
unique, they intentionally diverge from similar others to differentiate themselves (Lynn 
and Snyder 2002; Berger and Heath 2008). Thus, evidence suggests that the relationship 
between perceived similarities and cooperation depends on whether individuals value 
such similarities, or whether such similarity is consistent with maintaining or enhancing 
one’s positive self-image. Drawing from behavioral economics and psychology, I argue 
that when individuals have similar performance in an individual task, the difficulty level 
of the individual task is likely to moderate the effect of PPI on their subsequent 
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willingness to cooperate because it affects the extent to which individuals respond 
favorably to the information that they have similar performance with peers. 
Moderating Effect of Task Difficulty  
Although the traditional perspective in behavioral economics and social 
psychology is that people tend to be overconfident about themselves and overestimate 
their relative performance (Camerer and Lovallo 1999), recent research challenges this 
perspective by finding that people are systematically underconfident in some domains 
(Kruger 1999; Klar 2002; Moore and Cain 2007; Hales and Kachelmeier 2009). In 
particular, research documents that while individuals tend to overestimate their relative 
performance for easy tasks (“better-than-average” bias), they also tend to underestimate 
their relative performance for difficult tasks (“worse-than-average” bias) (Camerer and 
Lovallo 1999; Kruger 1999; Klar 2002; Hales and Kachelmeier 2009).  
The typical explanation for this phenomenon is that people tend to anchor on their 
perceived absolute performance when assessing their relative performance (Kruger 1999; 
Moore 2007). That is, if people view a task as being difficult, they will underweight the 
fact that the task would also be challenging for other people. In contrast, if people view a 
task as being easy, they will fail to adequately calibrate for the fact that other people will 
also find the task to be easy. Accordingly, people tend to underestimate their relative 
performance for difficult tasks and overestimate their relative performance for easy tasks. 
Because people have different relative expectations for difficult and easy tasks, 
the effect of information revealing similar performance is likely to depend on task 
difficulty. In particular, when a task is difficult, individuals expect to underperform 
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others and hence should react favorably upon learning from PPI that they and their peers 
share similar performance. Specifically, by revealing the similar task performance among 
peers, PPI also reveals the challenge common to all group members, thereby establishing 
a social bond over the revelation of “we are in this together” which in turn enhances 
subsequent cooperation. However, when a task is easy, individuals expect to outperform 
their peers and hence are less likely to respond favorably to PPI indicating that their 
performance is, in fact, no better than their peers. As a result, I predict that any social 
bonding precipitated by PPI will be more evident when the task is difficult than when it is 
easy. I state this prediction in the following hypothesis. 
H1: When individuals in a peer group share similar individual task 
performance, PPI on the individual task increases individuals’ 
subsequent willingness to cooperate with peers to a greater extent 
when the individual task is difficult than when it is easy. 
H2 - Peers with Dissimilar Performance 
 Prior research suggests that performance information that reveals differences 
between individuals can impair interpersonal relationships (Smith 2000; Buunk and 
Gibbons 2007). In particular, the social comparison literature documents that people tend 
to disassociate from outperforming others to maintain a favorable image (Tesser 1988; 
Dunn et al. 2012). For example, prior studies find that participants report jealousy toward 
a virtual person depicted as better than them (Salovey and Rodin 1984), rate friends as 
less close when friends outperform them (Tesser et al. 2000), and view a confederate with 
better performance as being less trustworthy (Dunn, Ruedy, and Schuweitzer 2012). 
Similarly, prior research also shows that people tend to be reluctant to associate with less 
successful groups and individuals (Cialdini and Richardson 1980; Snyder, Lassegard, and 
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Ford 1986; Ross and Wilson 2002; Stapel and Kooman 2005; Dunn et al. 2012). Overall, 
these findings suggest that individuals with different task performance are more likely to 
distance from each other rather than bond with each other, thus painting a pessimistic 
picture of the effect of information that reveals performance differences among 
individuals on their subsequent cooperation. Therefore, I expect PPI to decrease 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate when they have dissimilar individual task 
performance, on average. 
 To the extent that PPI decreases individual cooperation when performance 
similarity is low, it is unclear whether the adverse effect of PPI is stronger when the 
individual task is easy or when it is difficult. On the one hand, given that individuals tend 
to be overconfident about their relative performance on easy tasks, any alienating effect 
of PPI should be stronger for easy tasks. On the other hand, individuals tend to care more 
about their performance and exert greater effort for difficult tasks that can be more 
sensitive to ability. Consistent with this argument, Newman et al. (2017) find that losing 
a tournament for a difficult task has a more detrimental effect on altruistic behavior than 
losing a tournament for an easy task. As such, I do not predict an interaction between PPI 
and task difficulty when individuals have dissimilar task performance. I state my 
prediction in the following hypothesis. 
H2: When individuals in a peer group have dissimilar individual task 
performance, PPI on the individual task decreases individuals’ 
subsequent willingness to cooperate with peers, irrespective of the 
difficulty level of the individual task. 
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Chapter 4: Method and Design 
Participants 
I design and conduct my study in a dedicated research laboratory using z-Tree 
software (Fischbacher 2007).6 I recruit 192 student volunteers from the business school 
of a large public university to participate in experimental sessions that last approximately 
60 minutes.7 The average age of participants is 20.6 years old, and 58 percent of the 
participants are female.  
Experimental Procedure and Tasks 
 Figure 2 illustrates the experimental procedures. Upon entering the lab, 
participants randomly draw a seat number that assigns them to a pre-numbered computer 
terminal. The seat number also serves as an identifier to ensure that participants’ 
information remains confidential. After being seated at a computer, participants listen to 
the experimenter read the first set of instructions while following along from paper-based 
instructions (see Appendix A). The instructions inform participants that people sitting at 
the four adjacent computer terminals are assigned to one group, with groups remaining 
the same throughout the study. Participants also learn the study includes two main stages 
and receive detailed instructions about the Stage 1 task. To ensure their understanding of 
the Stage 1 task, participants complete a computerized comprehension quiz before 
proceeding to it. 
                                                          
6 This study is approved by my university’s Institutional Review Board. 
7 I performed three administrations: two in the summer and one in the fall. The inferences of the hypotheses 
tests remain the same if I control for the individual administration or whether the administration was 
conducted in the summer.   
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In the Stage 1 task, participants individually solve two-digit multiplication 
problems for four work periods. In each period, participants receive 12 problems on their 
computer screen, and their task is to input an answer to each problem. Appendix C 
presents the Stage 1 task z-Tree screen for each work period. Participants have a 
maximum of 180 seconds (three minutes) each period to work on the task. However, they 
can choose to end the work period at any time before the period ends. If a participant 
chooses to end the work period early, s/he cannot restart the work period but can relax or 
read newspapers provided at the workstation until the next work period begins. 
Participants receive fixed pay of $8 for completing the Stage 1 task, irrespective of the 
number of problems correctly solved.  
After finishing the all four work periods comprising Stage 1, participants receive 
paper-based instructions about the Stage 2 task (see Appendix B) and proceed to this task 
after completing another comprehension quiz on the task instructions. In the Stage 2 task, 
participants perform a one-period public-goods game with the other three participants in 
the assigned group. This task captures individuals’ willingness to cooperate with their 
peers. At the beginning of the task, the four participants in a group each receive 100 
points. Each participant decides how many of the 100 points to invest in a group project 
in increments of 10 points and keeps the rest of the 100 points. The total number of points 
the four participants invest in the group project is doubled and is then redistributed 
equally to the four participants. I also ask participants to estimate the average number of 
points the other three participants will invest in the group project. To encourage accurate 
estimation, I provide participants with a 10-point bonus if their estimation is within 10 
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points of the actual average. Participants’ total payoff in the Stage 2 task is the sum of the 
points they do not invest, the points allocated from the group project, and a bonus of 10 
points if the estimation is within 10 points of the actual average. Participants’ decisions 
are kept anonymous from other participants in their group, and participants do not learn 
their payoff in the Stage 2 task until they complete a post-experimental questionnaire. 
After completing the Stage 2 task, participants complete a post-experimental 
questionnaire that elicits supplemental responses and demographic information. After 
participants finish the questionnaire, the computer screen informs participants of the 
number of points participants earned in the Stage 2 task. As indicated in the instructions, 
the points are converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of 10 points = $1.00. Including the 
$8.00 fixed compensation for completing the Stage 1 task, participants earn an average of 
$24.95, ranging from $15.00 to $34.00. 
Several features of the experimental task warrant additional comments. First, I use 
two-digit multiplication problems as the Stage 1 task. The multiplication task satisfies 
three basic requirements that encourage social comparison and competitive behavior to 
improve individual task performance (Tafkov 2013). The three requirements are 
(1) comparison task similarity: participants know that other participants receive the same 
set of multiplication problems each period; (2) comparison target similarity: participants 
are recruited from business school classes and have similar related attributes; 
(3) comparison domain importance: the general problem-solving ability required by the 
multiplication task is important to individuals. Because this study aims to test the theory 
about whether social comparison information can increase rather than decrease 
 24 
 
cooperation among individuals, it is important to have a task that could induce social 
comparison among participants. 
Second, I choose to use fixed pay for the Stage 1 math task to avoid the potential 
for monetary consequences of Stage 1 possibly confounding the degree of cooperation in 
Stage 2.8  This setting is realistic given that fixed pay is commonly observed in practice 
(Baker et al. 1988; Hannan et al. 2013). Still, I acknowledge that, in practice, employees 
sometimes receive performance-based pay for certain individual tasks. In an extreme 
nonlinear incentive scheme such as a winner-takes-all tournament, the effect of PPI could 
differ because workers could receive very different pay despite similar task performance. 
However, to the extent that incentives for the individual task are approximately linear to 
task performance (i.e., individuals with similar levels of task performance receive similar 
pay), I expect that the effect of PPI on cooperation to generalize because the performance 
similarities or dissimilarities revealed by PPI would be consistent with the variation in 
pay.  
Third, the abstract public-goods game I operationalize as the Stage 2 task is 
unrelated to the Stage 1 task. I make the design choice that the individual task and the 
cooperative task are unrelated because my theory grounded on social bonding/distancing 
over similar/dissimilar task performance does not require an association between the two 
tasks. This design choice affords a clean test of the theory underlying my hypotheses 
because if the two tasks were related, there could be alternative reasons why PPI in the 
Stage 1 task might influence individuals’ willingness to cooperate in Stage 2. Moreover, 
                                                          
8 Prior research provides evidence that endowment heterogeneity can influence contribution decision in a 
public-goods setting (e.g., Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren 2005; Heap, Ramalingam, and Stoddard 2016).  
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even in practice, it is realistic that cooperative and individual tasks are often in unrelated 
areas and require different skill sets. Although abstract, the public-goods game task 
captures the complementary nature of cooperation in practice, as the final cooperative 
output is greater than the sum of the individual inputs. Thus, I expect that my findings 
would likely generalize to settings in which the cooperative task is a productive task. 
Experimental Design  
I employ a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects design that manipulates the availability of 
PPI and the difficulty level of the Stage 1 task and measures performance similarity in 
each group.  
I manipulate the availability of PPI by varying the Stage 1 task performance 
feedback received by participants after each work period and at the end of the task. In the 
No PPI condition, participants see the answer they submit for each problem and their 
performance (i.e., the number of problems correctly solved) after each period, along with 
a performance summary for all four periods at the end of Stage 1. In the PPI condition, in 
addition to feedback on their own performance, participants also see the answers and 
performance of each of the other three participants in their group. Figure 3 illustrates the 
performance feedback provided in each condition. 
I manipulate the difficulty level of the Stage 1 task by either allowing or 
disallowing participants to use pen and paper to solve the two-digit multiplication 
problems.9 In the Stage 1 task, participants in all conditions receive the same four sets of 
                                                          
9 In a contemporaneous study, Newman, Tafkov, and Zhou (2017) compare the negative effect of losing in 
tournament for difficult and easy individual tasks on prosocial behavior. They manipulate whether a task is 
difficult or easy by using two two-digit numbers for each problem (e.g. 42 × 48) in the difficult task 
condition and one-digit number by a two-digit numbers (e.g. 2 × 48) in the easy task condition. 
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math problems and are instructed not to use a calculator. However, participants in the 
Low Difficulty condition are provided with pen and paper for solving the problems. In 
contrast, participants in the High Difficulty condition do not receive pen or paper and are 
also explicitly instructed they must solve the problems without pen and paper.  
After collecting all data, I measure the performance variance of the Stage 1 task 
for each group and the median of the performance variance in each of the four assigned 
conditions. The median performance variance for each condition is 3.61 (No PPI and 
High Difficulty), 2.77 (PPI and High Difficulty), 4.39 (No PPI and Low Difficulty), and 
2.67 (PPI and Low Difficulty). A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test suggests there is no 
significant difference between the median variance of any two conditions (all two-tailed 
p > 0.315). I rely on the random assignment of participants to each group to generate 
meaningful differences in performance variance across groups. I classify a participant as 
being in Similar Performance condition if the performance variance of his/her group is 
below the median for the respective treatment condition, and as being in the Dissimilar 
Performance condition if at or above the condition median.10  
  
                                                          
10 The direction and inferences of the main results remain unchanged if I exclude the eight participants at 
the median, include the eight participants at the median in the Similar Performance condition, use the full 
sample median, or classify participants as being in the Dissimilar Performance condition if performance 
variance of their group is at the bottom tercile. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
Manipulation Checks  
 To check my manipulation of task difficulty, the post-experiment questionnaire 
asks participants to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, “I found the 
Stage 1 task challenging,” on a 7-point Likert-scale with endpoints of “Do not agree at all” 
(1) and “Very much agree” (7). An untabulated t-test shows that participants who cannot 
use pen and paper in the Stage 1 task perceive the task as more challenging (mean = 5.86) 
than participants who can use pen and paper (mean = 4.42), for a significant difference of 
1.44 (t190 = -7.32; p < 0.01, two-tailed). Consistent with these responses, participants who 
cannot use pen and paper on average solve significantly fewer multiplication problems 
(mean = 15.33) than those who can (mean = 31.70; t190 = 12.21; p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
Hence, I conclude that the task difficulty manipulation is successful. 
 I also check the validity of the performance similarity measure. The post-
experimental questionnaire asks participants to indicate the extent to which they agree 
with the statement, “I feel similar to my group members” on a 7-point Likert scale with 
endpoints of “Do not agree at all” (1) and “Very much agree” (7). In an untabulated 
ANOVA analysis, I find participants in the measured Similar Performance condition 
agree more with the statement than participants in the Dissimilar Performance condition 
(F1,188 = 4.98; p = 0.03, two-tailed). In turn, this difference is driven primarily by 
participants in the PPI condition, as indicated by a significant interaction between 
performance similarity and PPI on perceived similarity (F1,188 = 6.35; p = 0.01, two-tailed). 
In particular, in the presence of PPI, the mean in the Similar Performance condition is 
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4.43, and the mean in the Dissimilar Performance condition is 3.63 (F1,188 = 10.84; p < 
0.01, two-tailed). In contrast, in the absence of PPI, there is no significant difference in 
the extent of agreement between participants in the Similar Performance condition (mean 
= 3.56) and the Dissimilar Performance condition (mean = 3.69; F1,188 = 0.04; p = 0.84, 
two-tailed). This evidence confirms that the measured performance similarity condition 
successfully distinguishes groups with members of similar Stage 1 task performance from 
groups with members of dissimilar Stage 1 task performance as long as with PPI 
revealing this distinction. 
Effect of PPI on Contribution 
I measure each participant’s willingness to cooperate with peers using the number 
of points a participant invests in the Stage 2 public-goods game and refer to this variable 
as Contribution. H1 predicts that, when individuals have similar performance in an 
individual productive task, PPI increases Contribution when the individual productive 
task is difficult to a greater extent than when the individual productive task is easy. When 
individuals have dissimilar task performance in an individual productive task, H2 predicts 
that PPI decreases Contribution irrespective of the difficulty level of the individual 
productive task. Together, these two hypotheses imply a three-way interaction in the full 
sample, a significant two-way interaction between PPI and task difficulty in the 
subsample in which individual performance is similar in the peer group, and a significant 
main effect of PPI  in the subsample in which individual performance is dissimilar in the 
peer group. 
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Figure 4 presents the mean Contribution for each condition. In the Similar 
Performance condition (Panel A), PPI appears to increase Contribution when task 
difficulty is high but has no apparent effect when task difficulty is low. In the Dissimilar 
Performance condition (Panel B), PPI appears to have no overall effect irrespective of 
task difficulty.  
To test my hypotheses, I conduct a three-way ANCOVA with Contribution as the 
dependent variable, and PPI (PPI versus No PPI), Performance Similarity (Similar versus 
Dissimilar), and Task Difficulty (High versus Low) as independent factors. 11  I also 
include participants’ social value orientation (SVO) as a covariate. SVO is an indicator 
variable that equals one if an individual is classified as a prosocial person and zero if 
otherwise, based on the instruments developed by Van Lange et al. (1997).12 I use SVO 
to control for the variation in participants’ innate inclination to cooperate that is 
independent of my manipulation (Balliet, Parks, and Joireman 2009).13  
                                                          
11 Because there is no interaction between group members and each individual makes the decision in the 
public-goods game independently, I treat the Contribution of each participant as an independent 
observation. To ensure the assumption of independence, I compare the variance of Contribution within 
each four-people group in the study with the variance of Contribution within four ex-post randomly-
matched participants. I do not find any significant difference (t191 = 0.53; p = 0.60, two-tailed), supporting 
the assumption of independence. In addition, the main results are robust to regression analyses clustered on 
groups. 
12 In the instruments, participants answer nine questions in which they hypothetically decide payoff for 
themselves and another person. For each question, participants choose between a competitive option that 
maximizes the difference between their payoffs and the other’s, an individual option that maximizes their 
own payoff, and a prosocial option that maximizes the joint payoff of themselves and the other person. A 
participant is classified as a proself agent if consistently choosing the prosocial option for at least six times 
and proself otherwise. 
13 As expected, Table 1 shows that SVO has a significant relationship with Contribution (F1,183 = 4.56; p = 
0.03, two-tailed), confirming that SVO is an important covariate. However, in untabulated analyses, the 
three-way interaction remains significant without the control variable SVO (F1,184 = 3.15; p = 0.08, two-
tailed). Other demographic information such as the gender and the age is not significantly associated with 
Contribution so I do not include these variables as covariates.  
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Panel B of Table 1 reports the ANCOVA results, which show a significant three-
way interaction (F1,183 = 3.39; p = 0.07, two-tailed), indicating that the effect of PPI on 
Contribution depends on both Performance Similarity and Task Difficulty. Untabulated 
analyses confirm that the interaction effect is robust after controlling for the amount of 
time participants spend in the Stage 1 task (F1,182 = 3.20; p = 0.08, two-tailed) or 
participants’ Stage 1 task performance (F1,182 = 2.93; p = 0.09, two-tailed).14 Next, I 
conduct separate analyses in the Similar Performance and Dissimilar Performance 
conditions, respectively.  
Test of H1: Peers with Similar Performance 
 Panel A of Table 2 documents the results for participants in the Similar 
Performance condition. Consistent with H1, I find a significant two-way interaction 
between PPI and Task Difficulty on Contribution (F1,87 = 2.99; p = 0.04, one-tailed).15 
Follow-up analysis on this significant interaction effect, reported in Panel B of Table 2, 
shows that Contribution is significantly higher in the PPI condition than in the No PPI 
condition when task difficulty is high (F1,87 = 5.39; p = 0.02, one-tailed). However, when 
task difficulty is low, Contribution does not significantly differ between the PPI and No 
PPI conditions (F1,87 = 0.03; p = 0.89, two-tailed). Collectively, these results support H1, 
suggesting that when an individual productive task is relatively difficult, PPI that reveals 
performance similarities among employees in the individual productive task can enhance 
subsequent cooperation in a separate cooperative task. 
                                                          
14 In an untabulated analysis, the amount of time spent in the Stage 1 task is not significantly associated 
with Contribution (F1,182 = 0.38; p = 0.540, two-tailed). This evidence helps ruling out the alternative 
explanation that the Stage 1 effort provision reflects one’s willingness to cooperate and leads to the pattern 
of Contribution in Stage 2.  
15 Because of the directional prediction in H1, I report one-tailed p-values for this test.  
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Test of H2: Peers with Dissimilar Performance 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the results for participants in the Dissimilar 
Performance condition. Inconsistent with H2, I do not find that PPI has a significant 
negative effect on Contribution in the Dissimilar Performance condition (F1,95 = 0.90; 
p = 0.35, two-tailed). Furthermore, the effect of PPI does not appear to depend on Task 
Difficulty (F1,95 = 0.85; p = 0.36, two-tailed). These results suggest that PPI does not 
affect cooperation when individuals have dissimilar task performance. In the 
supplemental analyses section, I report additional analysis in the Dissimilar Performance 
condition to further explore these results. 
Supplemental Analyses for Theory Testing 
Effect of PPI on Self-Evaluation Deviation 
A key element of my theory is that, without PPI, people tend to underestimate 
their relative performance for a difficult task but overestimate their relative performance 
for an easy task. By revealing the performance distribution in the peer group, PPI helps 
individuals mitigate their systematic bias in self-evaluation. To provide corroborating 
evidence for the theoretical rationale underlying my prediction and primary findings, I 
examine the effect of PPI on participants’ self-evaluation of their relative performance. I 
expect that (1) participants have biases in their self-evaluation depending on the level of 
task difficulty; (2) PPI reduces participants’ underestimation of relative performance 
when it bonds participants in the condition of Similar Performance and High Task 
Difficulty but has little effect in other conditions.   
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 The post-experimental questionnaire asks participants to rate how they perceive 
their Stage 1 task performance.16 Specifically, participants indicate whether they perceive 
their performance to be: (1) Way above average; (2) Above average; (3) About average; 
(4) Below average; or (5) Way below average. I then classify participants based on the 
quintile in which their actual task performance resides within their assigned condition. I 
calculate the difference between the quintile estimated by participants and the quintile 
indicated by their actual performance to construct a measure of Self-evaluation Deviation. 
This variable is above (below) zero if a participant overestimates (underestimates) his 
relative performance.  
I plot the means of this Self-evaluation Deviation measure by condition in Figure 
5. In the absence of PPI, Self-evaluation Deviation is mostly negative (positive) when 
task difficulty is high (low), suggesting that participants appear to underestimate 
(overestimate) their relative performance in the individual task. The most evident effect 
of PPI is in the Similar Performance condition and High Difficulty condition, where Self-
evaluation Deviation becomes positive. 
I then conduct an ANOVA with Self-evaluation Deviation as the dependent 
variable and PPI, Performance Similarity, and Task Difficulty as the independent 
variables. As reported in Table 4, I find a significant three-way interaction (F1,156 = 3.02; 
p = 0.08, two-tailed). I then conduct separate analyses for groups with similar or 
dissimilar peer performance. Panel A of Table 5 shows that, among participants in the 
Similar Performance condition, the effect of PPI on Self-evaluation Deviation 
                                                          
16 I started collecting this variable after the initial administration, such that I have responses for 164 of the 
total 192 participants in the experiment.   
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significantly interacts with Task Difficulty (F1,80 = 5.64; p = 0.02, one-tailed). Consistent 
with my prediction, follow-up analysis of this interaction, reported in Panel B of Table 5, 
suggests that PPI does not appear to have a significant effect on Self-evaluation 
Deviation when task difficulty is low (F1,80 = 0.91; p = 0.17, one-tailed) but significantly 
mitigates participants’ worse-than-average biases when task difficulty is high (F1,80 = 
17.23; p < 0.01, one-tailed). Interestingly, for these participants, PPI not only completely 
removes their worse-than-average bias (mean = -0.67 in No PPI condition) but also leads 
to an overestimation of relative performance (mean = 0.69 in PPI condition). One 
potential explanation is that bonding with their peers over similar performance leads 
participants to overestimate the relative performance of their group in the population and 
thus overestimate their own relative performance in the population when answering the 
post-experimental questionnaire question, irrespective of their position in the peer group.  
Untabulated results indicate that PPI does not have a significant effect on 
participants’ relative performance estimation for participants in the Dissimilar 
Performance condition (F1,76 = 0.44; p = 0.51, two-tailed), irrespective of task difficulty 
(F1,76 = 0.07; p = 0.79, two-tailed). This result suggests that participants do not appear to 
update their self-evaluation after PPI reveals they and their peers have dissimilar 
performance in the task.  
Effect of PPI on Estimation of Others’ Contributions 
 As discussed in the theory section, the bonding effect of PPI could increase 
individual contributions in two non-exclusive ways. First, individuals could contribute 
more because PPI increases their estimation of their group members’ contribution. 
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Second, holding constant the estimation of their group members’ contribution, 
individuals could contribute more because they care more about the group and are more 
willing to contribute to the group’s success. To better understand the role of these two 
forces, I conduct the following analyses. First, I use the number of points that a 
participant estimates the other three group members invest in the group project 
(Estimation) as the dependent variable and conduct a three-way ANCOVA similar to that 
reported in Table 1. Untabulated results show that PPI does not have a significant main 
effect on Estimation (F1,183 = 2.05; p = 0.15, two-tailed), and that the effect of PPI does 
not interact with performance similarity or task difficulty (all p > 0.37, two-tailed). These 
results suggest that PPI does not appear to influence the extent to which participants 
believe their group members will contribute to the Stage 2 task.  
Next, in untabulated analyses, I add Estimation as a covariate in the three-way 
ANCOVA in Table 1. Results shows that, although the effect of Estimation on 
Contribution is significant (F1,182 = 219.60; p < 0.01, two-tailed), the three-way interaction 
between PPI, Performance Similarity, and Task Difficulty remains significant (F1,182 = 
3.04; p = 0.08, two-tailed). This result suggests that PPI appears to directly increase 
participants’ willingness to cooperate with other group members when they have similar 
performance in a difficult task, independently of any influence of workers’ estimates of 
others’ contributions.17  
                                                          
17 I find some evidence suggesting that participants’ positive feelings towards their group members helps 
explain their willingness to cooperate. A post-experimental question asks participants to rate their level of 
agreement to the statement, “As a whole, I like my group members on a 7-point Likert-scale with endpoints 
of “Do not agree at all” (1) and “Very much agree” (7). Including this variable as a covariate reduces the 
significance of both the three-way interaction and the simple effect of PPI in High Difficulty and Similar 
Performance.   
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Supplemental Analyses for H1 
Does the Bonding Effect Depend on the Shared Performance Level?  
 To the extent that PPI bonds individuals over common challenges in a difficult 
task, I expect the bonding effect of PPI to be stronger when individuals have similar poor 
performance than similar good performance. Within the subsample of High Task 
Difficulty and Similar Performance, I examine whether the positive effect of PPI on 
Contribution depends on the shared performance level in the Stage 1 task.  
 Although participants in the High Performance Similarity condition in general 
share relatively low performance when task difficulty is high, there is still some 
performance variation across groups, with the average performance for a group ranging 
from 4.5 to 23 in the Stage 1 task. I next run an untabulated regression analysis with 
Contribution as the dependent variable, PPI, the average Stage 1 task performance within 
a peer group, and their interaction as independent variables, and SVO as a covariate. I 
find a significant positive main effect of PPI on Contribution (t43 = 2.65; p < 0.01, one-
tailed), confirming the general bonding effect of PPI in this condition. Interestingly, I also 
find a significant negative interaction effect between PPI and the group average Stage 1 
task performance (t43 = -2.09; p = 0.02, one-tailed), indicating that the bonding effect of 
PPI in a difficult task is stronger when peers have similarly poor performance than when 
peers have similarly good performance. This result is consistent with the argument that 
the bonding effect of PPI occurs when revealing the shared struggle among individuals, 
further corroborating the theory underlying H1. 
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Motivational Effect of PPI in Stage 1  
 One potential concern for the bonding effect of PPI is that bonding over the 
similar performance in a difficult individual task could lead individuals to shirk in the 
individual task. Thus, to evaluate the overall benefits and costs of PPI, it is important to 
examine the effect of PPI in the individual productive task. I measure effort in the Stage 1 
task using the number of seconds spent by an individual over the four work periods. I 
measure performance in the Stage 1 task using the total number of problems solved by a 
participant over the four work periods. 
 As shown in Table 6, PPI significantly increases the number of seconds 
participants willingly spend on the Stage 1 task (F1, 184 = 2.85; p = 0.09, two-tailed), even 
though participants receive fixed compensation and can choose to end a work period 
early. Moreover, this positive motivational effect does not significantly depend on task 
difficulty or performance similarity (all p > 0.35, two-tailed).18 This finding suggests that 
providing employees with PPI on a challenging individual productive task could 
potentially increase both employees’ individual task motivation and subsequent 
cooperation by revealing performance similarities in the individual task. 
 However, as shown in Table 7, I do not find PPI has a significant effect on task 
performance in Stage 1 (F1,184 = 0.38; p = 0.54, two-tailed). To better understand why 
there is a lack of performance effect given the presence of an effort effect (i.e., more time 
                                                          
18 Given that the bonding effect could develop over time as PPI reveals performance (dis)similarity after 
each work period, I further examine whether there is any sign of effort reduction in the later work periods. 
In untabulated analyses, I use the number of seconds spent by an individual over the third and the fourth 
work periods as the dependent variable and find similar results. In particular, PPI significantly increases the 
time spent in the third and the fourth periods (F1,184 = 2.99; p = 0.09, two-tailed), and the effect does not 
interact with task difficulty or performance similarity (all p > 0.30, two-tailed).  
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spent), I first examine the pairwise correlation between the effort measure and the 
performance measure. I find the correlation between the effort measure and the 
performance measure is insignificant for both difficult and easy tasks (both p > 0.39, 
two- tailed). The correlation remains insignificant even if I remove participants with top 
and bottom 1% or 5% Stage 1 task performance for the two task conditions (all p > 0.18, 
two- tailed). This result suggests that the lack of performance increasing effect of PPI 
could be attributed to the fact that the experimental task in both High Task Difficulty and 
Low Task Difficulty conditions is more sensitive to ability than to effort.  
Supplemental Analysis for H2 
Role of Rank for Groups with Dissimilar Performance 
As for the effect of PPI in the Dissimilar Performance condition, I explore 
whether the effect of PPI on cooperation varies for individuals with higher- and 
lower-than-average performance rankings in the peer group. I rank Stage 1 task 
performance of the four participants in each group whose members have dissimilar 
performance and conduct a three-way ANOVA with Contribution as the dependent 
variable, and PPI (No PPI versus PPI), Task Difficulty (High versus Low), and Rank 
(High versus Low) as independent variables. As reported in Table 8, I find some evidence 
that PPI reduces the contributions of participants ranking first and second in the group 
when task difficulty is high (F = 2.95; p = 0.09, two-tailed). PPI does not appear to have 
a significant effect on other participants in the Dissimilar Performance condition. 
Together with the evidence in the Similar Performance condition, these results suggest 
that PPI could have a positive effect on cooperation when employees have similar 
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performance but have limited negative effect on cooperation when employees have 
dissimilar performance. 
Other Supplemental Analysis 
Similar vs. Dissimilar Performance in No PPI & High Task Difficulty condition 
One notable pattern in results is the difference in Contribution between the 
Similar Performance condition (mean = 53.21) and the Dissimilar Performance condition 
(mean = 68.57; t54 = 1.57, p = 0.12, two-tailed) when there is no PPI and the task 
difficulty is high. As participants in these two conditions performed the same task and do 
not receive any feedback on their relative performance, my theory does not necessarily 
predict a significant difference in Contribution between the two conditions. In this section, 
I examine whether this difference is driven by the group composition difference across 
the two conditions. In particular, I examine whether this difference can be explained by 
participants with extreme performance levels, accurate self-evaluation deviation, or 
perceptions of similarity with peers without PPI across the two conditions. I also discuss 
whether the differences in group composition drive the main result in my study.  
Extreme Performance 
First, I examine whether the difference in task performance (Similar vs. 
Dissimilar) leads to the difference in Contribution between the two conditions. Because 
the assignment to either Similar Performance or Dissimilar Performance condition is 
based on the performance variance in a group, participants in the Dissimilar Performance 
condition are more likely to have extremely high and low task performance in Stage 1. I 
examine whether excluding participants with extreme performance can gap the difference 
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in Contribution. I exclude participants with top and bottom 5% performance in the 
high-difficulty task (three participants from the Similar Performance condition and nine 
participants from the Dissimilar Performance condition) and compare Contribution 
between the two conditions again.19 After excluding these participants, although the mean 
Contribution does not appear to change much (54.80 in the Similar Performance 
condition 68.42 in the Dissimilar Performance condition), the difference between the two 
conditions becomes insignificant (t42 = 1.18; p = 0.24, two-tailed). 
I next conduct the main ANCOVA analysis with the exclusion of participants 
with bottom and top 5% task performance in each condition. Figure 6 plots mean 
Contribution by condition. As reported in Table 9 and Table 10, the results remain the 
same. In particular, both the three-way interaction effect between PPI, Task Difficulty, 
and Performance Similarity (F1,154 = 3.25; p = 0.07, two-tailed) and the two-way 
interaction effect between PPI and task difficulty in the Similar Performance condition 
(F1,81 = 1.62; p = 0.07, one-tailed) remain significant. Simple effect analyses suggest that, 
after excluding participants with extreme performance, PPI still has a significant effect on 
Contribution when revealing similar performance in the difficult task (F1,81 = 4.29; 
p = 0.02, one-tailed), but not when revealing similar performance in the easy task (F1,81  = 
0.01; p = 0.92, two-tailed).20  
                                                          
19 The top and bottom 5% performance cutoff point for the high-difficulty task is 31 and 4 and the bottom 
and top 5% for the low-difficulty task is 46 and 16.  
20 These analyses remain robust if excluding participants with top and bottom 10% performance. The top 
and bottom 10% performance cutoff point for the high-difficulty task is 28 and 5 and the bottom and top 5% 
for the low-difficulty task is 45 and 20.  
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Self-evaluation Deviation 
Next, I examine whether participants who do not underestimate their relative 
performance helps explain the difference in Contribution across the two conditions. As 
discussed in the supplemental analysis about Self-Evaluation Deviation, when task 
difficulty is high and there is no PPI, participants on average underestimate their relative 
performance. However, there are still some participants who overestimate or accurately 
predict their relative performance in this condition. I examine the difference in 
Contribution excluding these participants. First, I exclude participants whose Self-
Evaluation Deviation is positive, i.e., overestimating their relative performance (one in 
Similar Performance condition and four in Dissimilar Performance condition). Excluding 
these participants from the subsample where there is no PPI and the task difficulty is high, 
the difference between the Similar Performance condition (mean = 55.22) and the 
Dissimilar Performance condition (mean = 69.00) is no longer significant (t41 = -1.25; p = 
0.22). Next, I further exclude participants whose Self-Evaluation Deviation equals zero 
(ten in Similar Performance condition and ten in Dissimilar Performance condition). The 
difference between the Similar Performance condition (mean = 59.23) and Dissimilar 
Performance condition (mean = 57.00) remains insignificant (t21 = 0.14; p = 0.90).  
To examine the impact on my main result, I conduct the main ANCOVA analysis 
with the exclusion of participants who have positive and zero Self-Evaluation Deviation 
in the in No PPI and High Difficulty condition. I plot the mean of Contribution for each 
condition in Figure 7. As reported in Table 11 and Table 12, the results become weaker. 
In particular, the three-way interaction in the main sample is longer significant (F1,150 = 
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0.55; p = 0.46, two-tailed). In the Similar Performance condition, the two-way interaction 
effect between PPI and Task Difficulty is marginally significant (F1,72 = 1.58; p = 0.10, 
one-tailed), with a significant simple effect of PPI in the High Difficulty condition (F1,72 = 
2.17; p = 0.07, one-tailed). 
High Perceived Similarity 
Lastly, I examine whether participants in these two conditions have different 
perception of their similarity with their group members. In the absence of PPI, there is no 
significant difference in how similar participants perceive themselves with their group 
members between these two conditions (3.50 in the Similar Performance condition vs. 
3.75 in the Dissimilar Performance condition, F1,54 = 0.48; p = 0.49, two-tailed). However, 
compared with the Similar Performance condition, there are a few more participants in 
the Dissimilar Performance condition who perceive they are very similar with their group 
members. Specifically, while in the Similar Performance condition there are two 
participants who rate their similarity with their group members as greater than four on a 
7-Likert scale, there are six participants whose answer is greater than four in the 
Dissimilar Performance condition. As the perception of similarity and Contribution is 
significantly positively correlated (p = 0.02, two-tailed), this may explain why the 
Contribution level is higher in the Dissimilar Performance condition for a difficult task 
with no PPI. Consistent with this possibility, after excluding participants whose response 
to the Similarity question is greater than four, the difference between the Similar 
Performance condition (mean = 54.62) and the Dissimilar Performance condition (mean 
= 61.82) becomes insignificant (t48 = -0.67; p = 0.51, two-tailed).  
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Next, I conduct the main ANCOVA analysis with the exclusion of participants in 
No PPI condition whose response to the Similarity question is greater than four. I plot the 
mean of Contribution for each condition in Figure 8. As reported in Table 13 and Table 
14, the results become weaker but the inference remains the same.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Research 
Concluding Remarks 
Employees often have access to performance information about their peers. 
Although prior research predominantly focuses on the performance differences revealed 
by such information, the central premise of my study is PPI in the form of absolute 
performance feedback can also reveal performance similarities. Under this premise, my 
study examines the effect of PPI in an individual productive task on individuals’ 
willingness to cooperate with each other in a subsequent cooperative task. In a laboratory 
experiment, participants perform an individual math task and a subsequent public-goods 
game. I manipulate the presence of PPI and the difficulty level of the individual math task 
and measure performance similarity in the individual math task. I then examine the effect 
of PPI for the individual task on participants’ contributions in the public-goods game. 
Results indicate that the effect of PPI depends on both performance similarity and 
task difficulty of the individual productive task. In particular, consistent with my 
predictions, I find that when group members exhibit similar individual task performance, 
and when the individual task difficulty level is high, PPI significantly increases 
individual contributions in the subsequent public-goods game. This result suggests that 
PPI establishes a social bond among employees and enhances subsequent cooperation by 
revealing the challenge common to all group members. Conversely, when PPI reveals 
dissimilar performance among group members, PPI does not appear to affect subsequent 
cooperation except among relatively strong performers.   
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This study has important practical implications. First, it helps to explain why 
many organizations formally and informally provide employees with access to PPI on 
individual productive tasks despite the growing importance of employee cooperation and 
concerns over the possibly alienating effects of social comparison. My findings suggest 
that, when PPI reveals performance similarities among group members on a challenging 
individual task, PPI increases rather than decreases employee cooperation within the peer 
group. Second, my findings suggest that the bonding effect of PPI extends to cooperative 
tasks unrelated to the individual task to which the performance feedback pertains. This 
finding helps to explain why organizations often encourage employees to showcase their 
work. Third, I find that the bonding effect of PPI does not impair employees’ motivation 
in the individual productive task. This result suggests that organizations can design 
feedback systems to achieve both the motivational benefits and the cooperation benefits 
of PPI. Lastly, the results show that the level of performance similarity between 
employees is an important moderator of PPI. As performance similarities often reflect the 
selection effect of other management control practices (e.g., Campbell 2012; Hales, 
Wang and Williamson 2014; Cardinaels, Chen, and Yin 2017), my study supports the 
reasoning that organizations should consider the interaction between different features of 
management control systems (Grabner and Moers 2013). 
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
Similar to other studies, limitations of this study provide opportunities for future 
research. First, future research can directly examine the effects on employees’ subsequent 
cooperation of providing ranking feedback in addition to PPI in the form of absolute 
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performance level. The focus of the current paper is to examine the effect of the presence 
vs. absence of PPI on cooperation to provide the initial evidence. However, it would be 
interesting to further test my theory by manipulating whether participants only receive 
PPI, only receive the ranking information, or receive both PPI and the ranking 
information. To the extent that ranking information explicitly differentiates individuals 
even when they have similar performance, the bonding effect of PPI may diminish.  
Second, I consider and operationalize employee cooperation as a benign action 
that increases the overall social welfare of participants. However, as suggested by prior 
literature, employees could also collude with each other at the cost of the organization 
(e.g. Evans, Moser, Newman and Stikeleather 2015). In my setting, I do not find evidence 
of collusive effort reduction in the Stage 1 task. However, future research may 
distinguish the circumstances under which the bonding effect over PPI leads to either 
beneficial cooperative or detrimental collusive behavior to the organization. 
Third, the individual task performance in my study can be objectively measured 
(i.e., the number of math problems correctly solved). However, in practice, performance 
information can be qualitative and subjective, depending on the nature of the task (e.g., a 
creative task). Moreover, performance information about peers can be in the form of the 
work outcome itself, such as a completed project. Such performance information allows 
more ambiguity for employees to interpret whether peers have similar or dissimilar 
individual task performance. Even when the performance measure is objective, different 
calibration of the performance measure may also influence employees’ perception of 
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their similarity. Future research could examine whether the effect of PPI interacts with 
various attributes of the underlying performance measure.  
Fourth, I use a public-goods game as the cooperative task to capture the initial 
direct effect of PPI on subsequent cooperation. A public-goods game captures individuals’ 
willingness to cooperate and represents the complementary nature of cooperation in 
practice, as the final cooperative output is greater than the sum of the collective inputs. 
Future research can test the robustness of the result in alternative cooperative tasks. 
Moreover, to capture the initial effect of PPI, I use a single-period public goods game. 
Future research could examine whether the effect of PPI becomes stronger or weaker 
when cooperation involves multi-period considerations. Lastly, in the experiment, 
participants are unaware of the public-goods game in Stage 2 when performing the Stage 
1 task. In practice, employees could anticipate future cooperation opportunities when 
performing the individual task and receiving the related performance feedback. Future 
research could examine whether the knowledge of future cooperation opportunities 
interact with the effect of PPI.   
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Figures 
FIGURE 1 
PPI in Groups with Similar vs. Dissimilar Peer Performance 
 
 
 
                      Group A                                                      Group B 
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FIGURE 2  
Experimental Procedure 
 
  
Participants answer 
a quiz about 
instructions
Participants perform the Stage 
2 Task for one period
Participants answer PEQ and 
receive payments
Participants read general 
instructions and instructions for 
the Stage 1 Task
Participants answer 
a quiz about 
instructions
Participants perform the Stage 
1 Task for four work periods
Participants read instructions 
for the Stage 2 Task
Participants arrive at 
the lab
Participants draw a seat 
number and sit accordingly
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FIGURE 3  
Examples of Performance Feedback in the Stage 1 (Math) Task 
 
Panel A: No PPI Condition 
Feedback after Each Period 
Questions Seat 1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Number of 
Correct 
Answers 
 
 
Feedback after All Four Periods 
You have completed all four work periods for the Stage 1 Task. On the next screen, you will see 
a summary of the number of correct answers submitted by you over the four periods. Please click 
on the "Next" button to proceed. 
 
 Seat 1 
Period 1  
Period 2  
Period 3  
Period 4  
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FIGURE 3 Cont. 
Examples of Performance Feedback in the Stage 1 (Math) Task 
 
Panel B: PPI Condition 
Feedback after Each Period 
Questions Seat 1 Seat 2 Seat 3 Seat 4 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Number of 
Correct 
Answers 
    
 
Feedback after All Four Periods 
You have completed all four work periods for the Stage 1 Task. On the next screen, you will see 
a summary of the number of correct answers submitted by you and the other three participants in 
your group over the four periods. Please click on the "Next" button to proceed. 
 
 Seat 1 Seat 2 Seat 3 Seat 4 
Period 1     
Period 2     
Period 3     
Period 4     
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FIGURE 4  
Contribution 
 
Panel A: Similar Performance condition 
 
Panel B: Dissimilar Performance condition  
 
See variable descriptions in Table 1 
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FIGURE 5  
Self-Evaluation Deviation 
 
Panel A: Similar Performance condition 
 
Panel B: Dissimilar Performance condition 
 
See variable descriptions in Table 4 
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FIGURE 6 
Contribution in Subsample Excluding Participants with Top and Bottom Five Percent 
Performance 
 
Panel A: Similar Performance condition 
 
Panel B: Dissimilar Performance condition  
 
See variable descriptions in Table 1 
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FIGURE 7 
Contribution in Subsample Excluding Participants with Positive and Zero Self-Evaluation 
Deviation in No PPI and High Difficulty condition  
 
Panel A: Similar Performance condition 
 
Panel B: Dissimilar Performance condition  
 
See variable descriptions in Table 1 
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FIGURE 8 
Contribution in Subsample Excluding Participants Perceiving Similar as Peers without PPI 
 
Panel A: Similar Performance condition 
 
Panel B: Dissimilar Performance condition  
 
See variable descriptions in Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 56 
 
Tables 
TABLE 1 
Contribution in the Stage 2 Task 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)]   
  Performance Similarity        
  Similar   Dissimilar 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High 53.21   74.00   68.57   67.19 
 [55.00]  [75.00]  [85.00]  [90.00] 
  (35.80)   (28.73)   (37.39)   (39.20) 
  n=28 
 
n=20 
 
n=28 
 
n=32 
Low 71.00   70.83   61.00   74.00 
 [90.00]  [70.00]  [60.00]  [80.00] 
  (35.97)   (27.33)   (29.18)   (30.68) 
  n=20 
 
n=24 
 
n=20 
 
n=20 
                
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 3375.10 2.99 0.09 
Task Difficulty 1 369.19 0.33 0.57 
Performance Similarity        1 2.01 0.00 0.97 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 290.14 0.26 0.61 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 114.39 0.10 0.75 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 655.32 0.58 0.45 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 3822.75 3.39 0.07 
SVO 1 5145.47 4.56 0.03 
     
Error 183 1127.64 
                  
1. Contribution is the number of points a participant chooses to invest in the group project in the public-
goods game.  
2. I manipulate the availability of PPI by varying whether participants learn the performance of each 
group member or not in addition to their performance after each period. 
3. I manipulate Task Difficulty by either allowing participants to use pen and paper in the math task 
(Low Difficulty) or not (High Difficulty).  
4. I classify a participant as being in a group with Similar (Dissimilar) Performance if performance 
variance of the group is below (at or above) the median of performance variance in its condition.  
5. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 2 
Contribution in the Similar Performance Condition 
                
Panel A: Two-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 2290.41 2.24 0.07 
Task Difficulty        1 946.99 0.93 0.34 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 3056.61 2.99 0.04 
SVO        1  3075.49    3.01 0.07 
                
Error 87 1022.74     
                
Panel B: Simple Main Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is High     1   5.39 0.01 
                
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is Low     1   0.03 0.87 
                
1. See variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance Similarity in Table 
1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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1. See variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance Similarity 
in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
 
  
TABLE 3 
Contribution in the Dissimilar Performance Condition 
                
Panel A: Two-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 1106.64 0.90 0.35 
Task Difficulty        1 18.21 0.01 0.90 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 1049.89 0.85 0.36 
SVO        1  2132.58   1.73 0.19 
          
 
    
Error 95 1234.92     
                
Panel B: Simple Main Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is High     1   0.00 0.98 
                
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is Low     1   1.47 0.23 
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1. Self-Evaluation Deviation is the difference between the quintile estimated by participants and 
the quintile indicated by their actual performance. If the variable is positive (negative), it 
suggests that individuals overestimate (underestimate) their relative performance. 
2. See variable descriptions for PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance Similarity in Table 1 
3. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
  
TABLE 4 
Self-Evaluation Deviation 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)]   
  Performance Similarity 
  Similar   Dissimilar 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High -0.67   0.69   -0.54   -0.44 
  [-1.00]   [1.00]   [0.00]   [-0.50] 
  (0.82)   (0.70)   (1.25)   (0.96) 
 n=24  n=16  n=24  n=16 
Low 0.00   0.29   0.25   0.50 
  [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00] 
  (0.92)   (1.37)   (1.41)   (1.00) 
 n=20  n=24  n=20  n=20 
                
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 10.00 8.28 <0.01 
Task Difficulty 1 10.00 8.28 <0.01 
Performance Similarity        1 0.73 0.61 0.44 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 2.10 1.74 0.19 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 4.17 3.45 0.07 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 5.32 4.40 0.04 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 3.65 3.02 0.08 
     
Error 156 1.21 
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TABLE 5 
Self-Evaluation Deviation in Similar Performance Condition 
                
Panel A: Two-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 13.83 13.54 <0.01 
Task Difficulty        1 0.37 0.37 0.56 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 5.76 5.64 0.02 
                
Error 80 1.02     
                
Panel B: Simple Main Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is High     1   17.23 <0.01 
                
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is Low     1   0.91 0.17 
                
1. See variable descriptions for Self-Evaluation Deviation, PPI, Task Difficulty, and 
Performance Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 6 
Effort in the Stage 1 Task 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)   
  Performance Similarity        
  Similar   Dissimilar 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High 694.93   717.48   708.30   714.32 
 [720.00]  [720.00]  [720.00]  [720.00] 
  (74.24)   (7.67)   (39.77)   (19.67) 
  n=28 
 
n=20 
 
n=28 
 
n=32 
Low 713.38   715.66   708.50   715.36 
 [720.00]  [720.00]  [720.00]  [720.00] 
  (50.96)   (9.12)   (22.20)   (9.15) 
  n=20 
 
n=24 
 
n=20 
 
n=20 
                
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 4126.87 2.85 0.09 
Task Difficulty 1 926.35 0.64 0.43 
Performance Similarity        1 73.44 0.05 0.82 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 1097.35 0.76 0.39 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 414.65 0.29 0.59 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 687.99 0.47 0.49 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 1294.85 0.89 0.35 
     
Error 184 1450.12 
                  
1. Effort is the total number of seconds a participant voluntarily spends on the Stage 1 math task 
over the four work periods. 
2. See variable descriptions for PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance Similarity in Table 1 
3. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 7 
Performance in the Stage 1 Task 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)    
  Performance Similarity 
  High   Low 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High 13.29   13.15   16.64   17.34 
  [12.50]   [11.50]   [12.00]   [15.50] 
  (6.58)   (5.42)   (12.34)   (8.19) 
 n=28  n=20  n=28  n=32 
Low 29.45   33.42   32.40   31.20 
  [27.50]   [34.00]   [33.00]   [30.50] 
  (7.35)   (7.31)   (10.83)   (12.29) 
  n=20 
 
n=24 
 
n=20 
 
n=20 
        
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 32.24 0.38 0.54 
Task Difficulty 1 12667.10 149.90 <0.01 
Performance Similarity        1 199.30 2.36 0.13 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 14.07 0.17 0.68 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 54.45 0.64 0.42 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 134.98 1.60 0.21 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 104.66 1.24 0.27 
     
Error 184 84.50 
                  
1. Performance is the total number of math problems correctly solved by a participant over the 
four work periods.  
2. See variable descriptions for PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance Similarity in Table 1 
3. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 8 
Contribution for Low and High Rank in Dissimilar Performance Condition  
                
Panel A: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 780.02 0.68 0.41 
Task Difficulty 1 5.24 0.00 0.95 
Rank    1 2521.14 2.19 0.14 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 1264.50 1.10 0.30 
PPI × Rank       1 1538.41 1.33 0.25 
Task Difficulty × Rank 1 3035.43 2.63 0.11 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Rank  1 2902.39 2.52 0.12 
Error 92 1153.30     
                
Panel B: Follow-up Two-way Tests           
                
Source       df   F p-value 
PPI × Task Difficulty at High Rank 1   3.58 0.06 
     
PPI × Task Difficulty at Low Rank 1   0.14 0.71 
                
Panel C: Follow-up Simple Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI at High Rank  
when Task Difficulty is High 1   2.95 0.09 
      
Effect of PPI at High Rank  
when Task Difficulty is Low   1   1.11 0.30 
                
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. I rank participants based on their overall performance in the math task within each group. I 
assign participants ranked 1st and 2nd as High Rank and participants ranked 3th and 4th as 
Low Rank. 
3. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 9 
Contribution in the Subsample Excluding Participants with Top and Bottom Five 
Percent Performance 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)]   
  Performance Similarity        
  Similar   Dissimilar 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High 54.80   74.00   68.42   71.43 
 [60.00]  [75.00]  [80.00]  [90.00] 
  (37.32)   (28.73)   (37.89)   (36.88) 
  n=25 
 
n=20 
 
n=19 
 
n=28 
Low 71.67   71.74   61.88   82.14 
 [90.00]  [70.00]  [60.00]  [80.00] 
  (36.01)   (27.58)   (26.88)   (22.25) 
  n=18 
 
n=23 
 
n=16 
 
n=14 
                
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 4840.73 4.51 0.04 
Task Difficulty 1 612.68 0.57 0.45 
Performance Similarity        1 265.82 0.25 0.62 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 37.19 0.03 0.85 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 91.66 0.09 0.77 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 330.99 0.31 0.58 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 3481.94 3.25 0.07 
SVO 1 2594.69 2.42 0.12 
     
Error 154 1072.50 
                  
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 10 
Contribution in the Similar Performance Condition Excluding Participants with Top 
and Bottom Five Percent Performance 
                
Panel A: Two-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 1967.49 1.86 0.09 
Task Difficulty        1 981.08 0.93 0.34 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 2366.90 2.23 0.07 
SVO        1  2040.77  1.93 0.17 
                
Error 83 1059.80     
                
Panel B: Simple Main Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is High     1   4.29 0.02 
                
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is Low     1   0.01 0.92 
                
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
  
 66 
 
TABLE 11 
Contribution in the Subsample Excluding Participants with Positive and Zero Self-
Evaluation Deviation in No PPI and High Difficulty condition 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)]   
  Performance Similarity        
  Similar   Dissimilar 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High 54.80   74.00   68.42   71.43 
 [60.00]  [75.00]  [80.00]  [90.00] 
  (37.32)   (28.73)   (37.89)   (36.88) 
  n=25 
 
n=20 
 
n=19 
 
n=28 
Low 71.67   71.74   61.88   82.14 
 [90.00]  [70.00]  [60.00]  [80.00] 
  (36.01)   (27.58)   (26.88)   (22.25) 
  n=18 
 
n=23 
 
n=16 
 
n=14 
                
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 4840.73 3.75 0.05 
Task Difficulty 1 781.58 0.72 0.40 
Performance Similarity        1 848.72 0.78 0.38 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 809.44 0.75 0.39 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 472.00 0.44 0.51 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 60.85 0.06 0.81 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 598.23 0.55 0.46 
SVO 1 6953.92 6.43 0.01 
     
Error 150 1081.99 
                  
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 12 
Contribution in the Similar Performance Condition Excluding Participants with 
Positive and Zero Self-Evaluation Deviation in No PPI and High Difficulty condition 
                
Panel A: Two-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 804.66 0.97 0.17 
Task Difficulty        1 197.91 0.21 0.65 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 1478.84 1.58 0.10 
SVO        1    4076.68    4.36 0.04 
                
Error 72 1059.80     
                
Panel B: Simple Main Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is High     1   2.17 0.08 
                
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is Low     1   0.05 0.83 
                
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 13 
Contribution in the Subsample Excluding Participants Perceiving Similar as Peers 
without PPI 
                
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Means [Median] (Standard Deviations)]   
  Performance Similarity        
  Similar   Dissimilar 
Task Difficulty No PPI   PPI   No PPI   PPI 
High 54.62   74.00   61.82   67.19 
 [55.00]  [75.00]  [80.00]  [90.00] 
  (35.46)   (28.73)   (39.23)   (39.20) 
  n=26 
 
n=20 
 
n=22 
 
n=32 
Low 67.78   70.83   58.24   74.00 
 [85.00]  [70.00]  [60.00]  [80.00] 
  (36.55)   (27.33)   (30.05)   (30.68) 
  n=18 
 
n=24 
 
n=17 
 
n=20 
                
Panel B: Three-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 5388.87 4.71 0.03 
Task Difficulty 1 274.25 0.24 0.62 
Performance Similarity        1 0.09 0.09 0.77 
PPI × Task Difficulty 1 290.14 0.19 0.67 
PPI × Performance Similarity        1 114.39 0.00 0.98 
Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 655.32 0.11 0.74 
PPI × Task Difficulty × Performance Similarity        1 3822.75 1.88 0.17 
SVO 1 5145.47 4.36 0.04 
     
Error 170 1143.14 
                  
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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TABLE 14 
Contribution in the Similar Performance Condition Excluding Participants 
Perceiving Similar as Peers without PPI 
                
Panel A: Two-way ANOVA Tests           
          Mean  
Square 
    
Source       df F p-value 
PPI 1 2590.69 2.59 0.06 
Task Difficulty        1 352.88 0.35 0.55 
PPI × Task Difficulty        1 1977.62 1.98 0.08 
SVO        1  4092.60    4.10 0.05 
                
Error 83 999.13     
                
Panel B: Simple Main Effect Tests           
                
Simple Effects       df   F p-value 
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is High     1   4.78 0.02 
                
Effect of PPI when Task 
Difficulty is Low     1   0.02 0.89 
                
1. Please see variable descriptions for Contribution, PPI, Task Difficulty, and Performance 
Similarity in Table 1 
2. One-tailed p-values are indicated by boldface. 
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Appendices: Experimental Materials 
 
Appendix A 
Experimental Instruction I 
General Information 
Thank you for participating in this study. Please carefully read the following instructions. 
You will complete a series of quiz questions about the instructions before proceeding to 
the study. Before beginning the specific instructions, please keep in mind the following 
rules:  
1. NO DECEPTION  
This study will be carried out in the manner described to you, with no deception of 
any form. You will earn monetary compensation by performing tasks. You will 
receive all your compensation in cash at the end of today’s session.  
2. CONFIDENTIALITY 
To ensure confidentiality, your actions and decisions in the study will not be 
associated with your name. 
3. NO TALKING  
Please do not talk at all with your fellow participants during the session. In addition, 
please do not talk about the study with other students who might participate in future 
sessions. Communication among participants could jeopardize the study. If you have 
any questions, please raise your hand and the administrator will come to you and 
answer your question privately.  
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Overview 
You have randomly drew a seat number in the beginning of the session. Your seat 
number will be your identifier in today’s study.  
Based on the seat number you randomly drew, we have assigned you to a four-person 
group. Your group members will remain the same throughout today’s session.  
The study includes two main stages. You will complete Stage 1 before proceeding to 
Stage 2. The Stage 2 task will be explained to you after Stage 1. You will be paid for 
performing tasks in each stage, as explained later.  
After you finish both stages, you will complete a short questionnaire about the study. The 
entire session will take approximately 60 minutes.  
The figure below summarizes the timeline of today’s session. 
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Stage 1 Task  
Task 
Your task in Stage 1 is to solve two-digit multiplication problems. You will perform the 
task individually. 
High Task Difficulty condition 
Your task is to provide an answer for each problem. You must solve the problems 
without using a calculator, a pen and paper, or any other outside aid. 
Low Task Difficulty condition 
Your task is to provide an answer for each problem. You must solve the problems 
without using a calculator or any other outside aid, but you can use the pen and paper 
provided to you on the desk. 
Below are two examples of the multiplication problems and their answers. 
 Problem Correct Answer 
1. 39 × 80 3120 
2. 42 × 35 1470 
One tip for this task is to decompose the numbers to simplify the problem. For example, 
for 39 × 80, you can decompose 39 into 40 and -1. Then you can calculate 40  × 80 = 
3200, and -1 × 80 = -80 separately. The answer will be the sum of the two numbers 3200 
- 80 = 3120.  
For 42 × 35, you can decompose 42 into 40 and 2. Then you can calculate 40 × 35 = 1400, 
and 2 × 35 = 70 separately. The answer will be the sum of the two numbers 1400 + 70 = 
1470.  
Work Period 
You will perform the task for four periods. Each period you will receive 12 problems. 
You have a maximum of 180 seconds (three minutes) each period to work on the task. 
You will see a countdown timer on the top right-hand of the screen.  
You can choose to end the work period early anytime before the period ends. Once you 
choose to end the work period early, you cannot restart the task in that work period, and 
you are free to relax and read the newspaper provided to you until the next work period 
starts. 
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If you choose to use the entire work period time, when the work period is over the 
computer will automatically end the task and ask you to submit your answers. 
No PPI condition 
At the end of each work period, you will see the output of your work, i.e. the answer you 
submited for each problem and the number of problems you correctly solved in that 
period.  
PPI condition 
At the end of each work period, you will also see the output of your group members. In 
particular, you will see the number of problems that each of the other three participants in 
your group correctly solved in that period. Your group members will see the number of 
problems that you correctly solved in that period as well. 
Compensation 
You will receive $8 for completing the Stage 1 task, irrespective of the number of 
problems you solve correctly. 
Summary 
  Stage 1 Task 
  
What do I do? Solve two-digit multiplication problems 
How many periods? Four periods; 12 problems per period. 
How long each period? 180 seconds but participants are free to end the period early. 
What feedback do I receive? No PPI condition: 
 
You will see the number of problems correctly solved by 
you. 
 
PPI condition: 
 
You will see the number of problems correctly solved by you 
and by each of the three participants in his or her group.  
 
Your group members will also see the number of problem 
correctly solved by you 
 
 74 
 
When do I receive 
feedback? 
At the end of each period. 
How much do I earn? Every participant receives $8 for Stage 1. 
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Appendix B 
Experimental Instruction II 
Stage 2 Task 
You will perform a task in Stage 2 with the other three members in your group. Your 
group members are the same as in Stage 1.  
Your compensation in Stage 2 is calculated in points. At the end of the study, the total 
amount of points you earn will be converted to dollars at the rate of 10 points = $1 dollar.  
Task Description 
You and your group members each receive 100 points at the beginning of the period. 
Your task is to decide the amount of points to invest into a group project in an interval of 
10 (e.g., 0, 10, 20, 30…100). You will keep the points that are not invested.  
After the investment, the total number of points you and your group members invested in 
the group project is doubled. Each group member shares equally in the amount invested 
in the group project. Thus, the income for each group member will be  
2 × sum of total investment in the group project / 4 members 
Examples 
If you and your group members each invest 100 points in the group project, the total 
investment is 100 × 4 = 400 points. This amount will be doubled to 800 points and then 
divided equally among the four group members. Each group member, including you, 
would receive 200 points.  
If you invest 80 points and your group members on average invest 40 points in the group 
project, the total investment is 80 + 40 × 3 = 200 points. This amount would be doubled 
to 400 points and then divided equally among the four group members. Each group 
member, including you, would receive 100 points. Plus the 20 points you did not invest, 
you would receive 100 + 20 = 120 points. 
Decision 
1. You will decide on how many of the 100 points you want to invest in the group 
project.  
2. You will estimate the average amount of points the other three members in your 
group invest in the group project. If your estimate is within +/- 10 of the actual 
average, you will receive additional 10 points.  
Your group members will have the same decisions to make as you. You will not know 
the decision made by your group members and your group members will not know your 
decision until the end of today’s session. 
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Compensation  
Your total compensation for the Stage 2 Task is:  
Points that you do not invest (= 100 – investment to the group project) + 
Points from the group project (= 2 × sum of total investment in the group project / 4) + 
Points from guessing the average investment of other group members (= 10 if within 10 
points of the actual average) 
At the end of today’s session, you will learn your total compensation for the Stage 2 Task. 
If it is not an integral number, it will be rounded to the nearest dollar. 
Summary 
  Stage 2 Task  
  
What do I do? Decide how to many of the 100 points you want to 
invest in the group project;  
Estimate the average amount of points your three 
group members invest in the group project. 
How many periods? One period. 
With whom do I work in the task? Same group members as in Stage 1. Every participant 
will perform the task with all three other group 
members. 
What feedback do I receive? At the end of today’s session, participants learn their 
total compensation in the Stage 2 Task and the 
average investment of the other three group members. 
How much do I earn? You will receive the sum of the points you do not 
invest and the points allocated from the group project.  
You will also receive a 10 point bonus if your 
estimate of the average investment of your group 
members is within 10 points of the actual average. 
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Appendix C 
z-Tree Screens of the Stage 1 Task 
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Period 1 
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Period 2 
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Period 3 
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Period 4 
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Appendix D 
Questionnaire  
 
Please complete this questionnaire to help us better understand how you made your 
decisions today. 
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements related to the Stage 1 
task? 
a) I found the Stage 1 task fun. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
b) I found the Stage 1 task challenging. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
c) It was important for me to perform well in the Stage 1 task. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
d) I think performance in the Stage 1 task depends on one’s general intelligence level. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
e) I think performance in the Stage 1 task depends on one’s effort level. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very 
much 
agree 
No PPI Condition 
 
f) I would be glad if I can see the work output of my group members. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
g) I would be glad if my group members could see my work output. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
f) I was concerned about how well I did in the Stage 1 task relative to my group 
members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
PPI Condition 
 
g) I was glad to see the work output of my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
h) I was glad that my group members could see my work output. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
i) I compared my output in the Stage 1 task with the output of my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
j) I was concerned about how well I did in the Stage 1 task relative to my group 
members. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
2. To what extent do you agree with the following statements related to your group 
members in general? 
 
a) As a whole, I like my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
b) I feel similar to my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
c) I feel close to my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
d) I trust my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
e) I feel my group members are trustworthy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
f) I view my group members as teammates. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
g) I think my group members are intelligent. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
h) I think my group members are competent. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
i) I feel my group members are cooperative. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
j) I feel my group members are competitive. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
k) I would like to spend some time with the group members I was matched with. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
l) I cannot see myself being friends with my group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
m) If given the opportunity to perform the Stage 2 task with three other different 
participants, I would prefer to perform the tasks with my current group members. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
 86 
 
3.  
a) I am satisfied with my performance in the Stage 1 task. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
b) How well do you think you performed in the Stage 1 task? 
 
o Way above average performance 
o Above average performance      
o About average performance 
o Below average performance 
o Way below average performance 
c) I feel I was competing with my group members in the Stage 1 task. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
4. In your own words, please describe the factor(s) that influenced the number of points 
you invested in the group project in the Stage 2 task.  
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5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about yourself? 
 
a) I think general intelligence is an important ability to succeed in life. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
b) I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
c) If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare what I have done 
with how others have done. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
d) I am not the type of person who compares often with others. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
e) I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
 
f) I often try to find out what others think who face similar problems as I face. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Do not 
agree at all 
    
 
Moderately 
agree 
    
 
Very much 
agree 
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6. Please imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person.  This person 
is someone you do not know and that you will not meet in the future. Below, you will 
make nine choices to allocate hypothetical money between you and the other person. 
For each of the nine choices below, please circle either column A, B, or C to 
indicate the option that you prefer most. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Please just choose the option that you prefer most. Note that each question below is 
independent of the other questions. That is, choices do not accumulate across 
questions. 
 
1) 
  
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive: 
 
480 
 
540 
 
480 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
80 
 
280 
 
480 
 
 
2) 
  
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive: 
 
560 
 
500 
 
500 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
300 
 
500 
 
100 
 
 
3) 
  
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive: 
 
520 
 
550 
 
580 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
520 
 
120 
 
320 
 
 
4) 
  
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive: 
 
500 
 
560 
 
490 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
100 
 
300 
 
490 
 
 
5) 
  
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive: 
 
560 
 
500 
 
490 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
300 
 
500 
 
90 
 
 
6) 
  
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive 
 
500 
 
500 
 
570 
 
 
 
Other receives 
 
500 
 
100 
 
300 
 
 
7) 
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
You receive: 
 
510 
 
560 
 
510 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
510 
 
300 
 
110 
 
 
8)   A  B  C  
 
 
You receive: 
 
550 
 
500 
 
500 
 
 
 
Other receives: 
 
300 
 
100 
 
500 
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9) A B C 
 
You receive 
 
480 
 
490 
 
540 
 
 
 
Other receives 
 
100 
 
490 
 
300 
 
 
 
 
7. Below are six options. Each option has two possible outcomes and each outcome has 
a 50% probability of occurring. Although the payoffs are hypothetical, please choose 
the option that is most attractive to you as if the option you choose will generate 
actual payoffs to you. 
 
Option      Outcome       Probability 
 
A 
$28  50% 
$28  50% 
B 
$24  50% 
$36  50% 
C 
$20  50% 
$44  50% 
D 
$16  50% 
$52  50% 
E 
$12  50% 
$60  50% 
F 
$2  50% 
$70  50% 
 
 
More Questions on Next Page 
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8. Below is a list of words that describe feelings people have. For each word, please 
circle the number that best describes the extent to which you have that feeling 
right now.   
 
  Not At All A Little Moderately Quite a Lot Extremely 
Content 0 1 2 3 4 
Sad 0 1 2 3 4 
Excited 0 1 2 3 4 
Tense 0 1 2 3 4 
Confused 0 1 2 3 4 
Angry 0 1 2 3 4 
Anxious 0 1 2 3 4 
Surprised 0 1 2 3 4 
Enthusiastic 0 1 2 3 4 
Interested 0 1 2 3 4 
Calm 0 1 2 3 4 
Happy 0 1 2 3 4 
Ashamed 0 1 2 3 4 
Proud 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
More Questions on Next Page 
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9. Please provide the following demographic information. 
a. Gender:  Male ______    Female ______ 
 
b. Age: ______ 
 
c. Years of work experience: __________ 
 
d. Is English your first language?   Yes ______    No ______ 
 
e. GPA: __________ 
 
f. Student status:       
a) Freshman 
b) Sophomore 
c) Junior  
d) Senior         
e) Graduate 
g. Academic major 
o Accounting 
o Finance 
o International Business 
o Management 
o Management Information Systems 
o Marketing 
o Science and Technology Management (STM) 
o Supply Chain Management 
o Business Analytics 
o Technology Commercialization (MSTC) 
o Other 
h. Have you attended other accounting research study before?  
 
Yes ______    No ______ 
 
 
 
 
 92 
 
 
 
You have now completed the questionnaire.  Thank you! 
 
PLEASE TURN BACK TO YOUR COMPTUER SCREEN NOW 
AND ENTER THE FOLLOWING PASSCODE _______ TO PROCEED. 
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